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to any amending legislation which may be introduced. The political
reality is that the Government is reluctant to introduce any amending
legislation. Were it to do so, challenges are particularly likely if
its legislative proposals fall short of Frodl's interpretation of Hirst: the
six month timetable may merely have postponed the need to clarify the
Convention's requirements.
SOPHIE BRIANT
NO LONGER A PRIVILEGED FEW: EXPENSE CLAIMS, PROSECUTION AND
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE
THE publication of the expenses claims of Members of Parliament by
the Daily Telegraph in 2009 revealed false claims made by MPs for
costs incurred in the performance of their Parliamentary duties. David
Chaytor, James Devine, and Elliot Morley, three MPs, were subse-
quently charged with false accounting, under section 17(l)(b) of the
Theft Act 1968, for claiming non-existent expenses. The MPs argued
that the criminal courts did not have jurisdiction to try their cases
because they were protected by parliamentary privilege. This conten-
tion was rejected in the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal.
The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment for the Court of Appeal
(R v. Chaytor (and others) [2010] EWCA Crim 1910), concluded
"parliamentary privilege.. .has never ever attached to ordinary criminal
activities by members of Parliament" (at [81]).
The Supreme Court in R v. Chaytor (and others) [2010] UKSC 52,
[2010] 3 W.L.R. 1707 unanimously decided that expense claims are not
protected by parliamentary privilege within the meaning of article 9 of
the Bill of Rights 1689, nor are they a matter within the exclusive juris-
diction of Parliament. The Supreme Court's decision clarifies several
issues. First, the Supreme Court was clear that the issue in question
was whether parliamentary privilege attached to the claiming of
MPs expenses- a question that must be determined independently of
whether or not such claims were dishonest (at [25]). It was inappro-
priate for the Court of Appeal to have examined the question on the
premise that the claims were dishonest as "[p]rivilege from criminal
prosecution would be nugatory if it did not apply to criminal conduct"
(at [24]).
Second, the court distinguished between two bases of parliamentary
privilege (at [12]-[13]). The first originates from article 9 of the Bill
of Rights, which provides that "freedom of speech and debates" or
"proceedings in Parliament" cannot be questioned in court. In the
leading judgment, Lord Phillips clarified that whether a matter can be
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considered to fall within "proceedings in Parliament" must relate to
how closely it impacts on the "core or essential business of Parliament"
protected by article 9, which is "directed [at] freedom of speech and
debate in the Houses at Parliament" (at [47]). Submitting expense claim
forms does not qualify as "proceedings in Parliament" as judicial
scrutiny of such claims would not inhibit debate in Parliament or affect
its core business (at [48]). This requirement for a close nexus to the
article's objective must be right. Article 9 should be narrowly construed
to ensure that all claims to privilege are tested in light of its important
purpose: to protect the MPs' freedom to debate in Parliament without
interference. This freedom as envisaged by the Bill of Rights is so
fundamental that privilege under article 9 is absolute; it is incapable of
waiver even by Parliament (at [25]).
The second base of privilege examined by the Supreme Court relates
to the matters under the exclusive cognizance of Parliament. The doc-
trine that Parliament has an exclusive right to manage certain affairs is
wider than that under article 9, but the right is not absolute and may be
waived. Would submission of expense claims fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Parliament? The court held not. Making claims for
parliamentary allowances is an administrative activity; the court agreed
with the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Report (1998-99)
(at 247-8) that only in "exceptional" circumstances were management
functions so closely and directly connected to parliamentary proceed-
ings that judicial intervention intruded on Parliament's sovereignty.
Parliament has, through legislation -the Parliamentary Corporate
Bodies Act 1992 which allows actions in contract and tort to be
brought by and against the House -and administrative changes,
relinquished any claim of exclusive cognizance in relation to adminis-
trative business of the two Houses (at [72], [74] and [89]). Further, as in
previous criminal proceedings, Parliament had cooperated with the
police investigation of the expense scandal - an indication that it did
not wish to assert exclusive jurisdiction over the issue (at [90]-[91]).
Parliament may also take disciplinary measures against criminal con-
duct that amounts to contempt of Parliament, but this does not exclude
the courts' "different, but overlapping, jurisdiction" (at [81]).
Third, the comments made by the Court are indicative of the
approach of the court towards narrowly construing the scope of par-
liamentary privilege. While Lord Phillips considered the two bases of
parliamentary privilege separately, Lord Rodger, in his concurring
opinion, reasoned that unless the matter was within the exclusive cog-
nizance of Parliament, article 9 could not itself confer privilege. As
such, "...there is only one basic question": whether the matter falls
within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction (at [102]-[104]). But collaps-
ing both bases into one question in this way obscures the distinction
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between protection based on article 9 and the exclusive cognizance of
Parliament. Lord Phillips' approach is preferable because it recognises
that freedom of speech and debate lie at the very heart of what privilege
aims to protect. These issues are afforded absolute protection under
article 9 and may overlap with, but are distinct from, issues that fall
under the exclusive cognizance of Parliament.
The unanimous decision of the nine Justices is an unsurprising
development, given the way that judicial scrutiny of parliamentary
privilege has evolved. Judicial and parliamentary views have moved
from a Blackstonian absolutist concept of privilege towards a demo-
cratic model (see J. Chafetz, Democracy's Privileged Few (2007)) - a
movement in parallel with increasing challenges to the doctrine
of undiluted parliamentary sovereignty. The enactment of the
Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 to regulate MP allowances and the
Bribery Act 2010, which applies equally to parliamentarians, further
illustrate the changing perceptions regarding the immunity of demo-
cratic representatives. Privilege no longer appears "to dazzle lawyers
and judges outside Parliament" (at [101]). The scope of privilege is
increasingly being narrowed to avoid it being used for reasons un-
related to those functions considered essential to an MP's democratic
duties, central to which is the ability to debate openly and fearlessly in
Parliament. Following the Supreme Court's decision that privilege did
not pose any bar to prosecution of the MPs, David Chaytor pleaded
guilty and was sentenced in the Southwark Crown Court on 7 January
2011 to 18 months in jail. His conviction is a sober reminder that
privilege cannot be used to shield MPs from acts which stand in stark
contrast to the very ideal it is meant to protect: the fostering of
accountability and democratic governance through open debate.
YVONNE TEW
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: "PUBLIC LAW" FUNCTIONS, MENS REA AND QUANTUM
IT is not uncommon to read that "[d]amages and compensatory rem-
edies have not traditionally played a major role in British public law"
(Turpin & Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 6th ed,
(Cambridge 2007) p. 276). However, damages actions in tort have
long served "public law" functions: protecting fundamental rights,
controlling and delineating the bounds of governmental power, and
giving effect to rule-of-law principles of equality, and government
under law. As the recent case of Muuse v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 453, [2010] W.L.R.(D) 108
demonstrates, exemplary damages are a significant aspect of this
